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COMMENTS ON "AN INTERNATIONAL
REGIME FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION," BY RT HON PROFESSOR
SIR GEOFFREY PALMER
ALAN S. MILLER*
Former Prime Minister Palmer may be the most valuable export
ever to leave New Zealand for the United States. His United Nations
speech in 1989 brought badly needed attention to the question of insti-
tutional reform for addressing global environmental problems. This
topic will assume center stage with the June 1992 United Nation Con-
ference on Environment and Development. An international legisla-
tive body devoted to "decisions on sustainable policies for global
development"1 may not be imminent but, as Gareth Porter and Janet
Brown observe, it is no longer "hopelessly idealistic." 2 If democracy
can come to Eastern Europe, why not also the environment?
The saga of the Montreal Protocol recounted by former Prime Min-
ister Palmer demonstrates the limits of even successful treaties: the
process is cumbersome and time-consuming, and agreements are not
easily policed. International regimes are emerging quickly measured
by the timescales of international law and procedure, but perhaps not
nearly fast enough to avoid environmental disaster:
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And whether such consensus may be achieved in time to prevent
serious impoverishment of the biosphere and severe diminution of
environmental quality cannot be foreseen. Destructive and irre-
versible environmental effects such as significant change in the
composition of the earth's atmosphere could occur before people
and nations are prepared to transcend the barriers that limit their
cooperation in mutual self-interest.3
My concern is whether the pursuit of an international legislative en-
vironmental body represents the most promising solution to this prob-
lem. The effort necessary to achieve such a sweeping reform would
certainly be considerable and would compete with climate change and
other pressing environmental problems for public attention and diplo-
matic resources. If we apply the principles of environmental assess-
ment and compare the costs and benefits of former Prime Minister
Palmer's proposal with other reasonably available alternatives, would
we conclude that such action is justified?
Building a constituency for a supranational authority will not be
easy. The environmental benefits of institutional reform proposals tend
to be indirect and abstract; public support can be marshalled for
protecting the ozone layer much more easily than for creating a new
institution to do the job. One condition imposed by the wealthy indus-
trialized nations in return for supporting the creation of a fund to assist
developing countries to adopt substitutes for ozone depleting com-
pounds was that it not involve any new institution.4
There also are some potentially serious drawbacks to an interna-
tional environmental legislative body. One is a possible reduction in
pressure for unilateral action, now often a precursor to international
agreements. A small group of nations led by the United States played a
critical role in pushing successfully for international action to protect
the ozone layer after first adopting strong domestic policies.5 The eco-
nomic interests opposed to action will be represented in any forum, but
3. LYNTON K. CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: EMER-
GENCE AND DIMENSIONS 304 (2d ed., 1990).
4. RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFE-
GUARDING THE PLANET 152-57 (1991) (explaining that donor countries "stressed the
difficult and time consuming process involved").
5. Id. at 205-06.
Preemptive actions can also support moral suasion in encouraging future participa-
tion by other countries. In addition, action by major countries can slow dangerous
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would the same aggressive political leadership be as likely and effective
in an international body?
International forums and negotiations have also not been as open to
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media as in most in-
dustrialized societies.6 The linkage between environment and trade has
become an important issue for the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), but GATT procedure has no provisions for public in-
volvement. Some negotiations have permitted NGOs considerable op-
portunity for observation, but it cannot be taken for granted that most
governments (especially non-democratic developing countries) would
be willing to include such rights in a new legislature.
The issue of immediate concern to Former Prime Minister Palmer,
climate change, ironically illustrates some of the risks of a broad legis-
lative approach to international environmental problems. The climate
negotiations were initiated under the auspices of the United Nations
General Assembly, in contrast with the ozone negotiations facilitated
by the United Nations Environment Program. The basic reason for
this was the desire of developing countries for the greater degree of
control they hold in the General Assembly, whereas some governments
felt they were ill-served by the United Nations Environment Program
in the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol. Any other international
legislative body dedicated to environment and development is likely to
reflect similar concerns.
The negotiation of international agreements on a case-by-case basis
is cumbersome, but it also has its advantages. First, only interested
parties need be involved, reducing the size and complexity of negotia-
tions. Second, the likelihood of parties participating primarily to
achieve leverage on unrelated matters is also reduced.7 Finally, the
negotiation process also offers a focus for educating the public and
building political support.
These concerns lead me to question whether a new legislative body is
likely to be necessarily more effective in responding to the sense of ur-
gency former Prime Minister Palmer effectively communicates. The
United States Congress offers proof that a representative body can be
as unresponsive to social problems as any form of government. Indeed,
other experts with concerns similar to those he expresses have drawn
6. See generally Wirth, American Environmental Law and the International Legal
System, VA. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming, 1992).
7. Sebenius, Negotiating a Regime to Control Global Warming, in GREENHOUSE
WARMING: NEGOTIATING A GLOBAL REGIME 69 (1991).
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very different conclusions: "Given the urgency of the task, the most
expedient and most economic course of action would be to activate and
accelerate all available international machinery without waiting for
new global institutions."'
Many of former Prime Minister Palmer's goals might be achieved by
more effective utilization of the United Nations Environment Program
and other existing international institutions. There are already numer-
ous international agencies with powers that need to be redirected to-
ward environmental protection. The United Nations Environment
Program has very limited resources and authority, but the Food and
Agriculture Organization has enormous resources relevant to forestry.
The World Health Organization has considerable expertise in pollu-
tion, and there are agencies for a wide range of other environmental
and development related topics.9
Existing institutions have too often contributed to environmental
problems. The World Bank, for example, has been severely criticized
for its inability to consider any approach to energy planning other than
large-scale power plants.10 Reform efforts have already achieved some
success; in the United States, legislation has been passed that requires
the exercise of the American vote in the multilateral development
banks to support more stringent environmental reviews of proposed
projects. 11
We are also beginning to become much more clever about the "state-
craft" associated with international environmental law, learning to
make such agreements more quickly and effectively. The Montreal
Protocol and other recent agreements illustrate a variety of more effec-
tive techniques for promoting compliance, accelerating amendments in
response to new scientific information, and encouraging participation
without resorting to a lowest-common denominator approach. 12
Whatever one's view of proposals for a supranational authority, the
8. PETER H. SAND, LESSONS LEARNED IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERN-
ANCE 35 (1990).
9. See Developments in the Law - International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1484, 1580-90. "The number of IGOs [intergovernmental organizations] with
competence in the environmental area is astounding." Id. at 1582.
10. M. PHILLIPS, THE LEAST-COsT ENERGY PATH FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
ENERGY EFFICIENT INVESTMENTS FOR THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS
(1991).
11. 22 U.S.C. § 2621(a),(k) (1988).
12. See generally SAND, supra note 8. See also Chayes and Chayes, Adjustment and
Compliance Processes in International Regulatory Regimes, in PRESERVING THE
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global environment can only benefit from closer examination and dis-
cussion of former Prime Minister Palmer's noble vision. We can only
hope that we identify effective solutions before encountering the poten-
tial catastrophe he describes so convincingly.
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF SHARED LEADERSHIP 280 (J. Mathews
ed., 1991).
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol42/iss1/5
